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Abstract—Cognitive social simulation is a computer simulation
technique that aims to improve our understanding of the dynam-
ics of socially-situated and socially-distributed cognition. Cogni-
tive architectures are typically used to support cognitive social
simulation; however, the most widely used cognitive architecture
– ACT-R – has, to date, been the focus of relatively few cognitive
social simulation studies. The current paper reports on the results
of an ongoing effort to develop an experimental simulation
capability that can be used to undertake studies into socially-
distributed cognition using the ACT-R cognitive architecture.
An ACT-R cognitive model is ﬁrst presented that demonstrates
one approach to solving a task previously used to investigate
sensemaking performance within teams of human subjects. An
approach to the implementation of an ACT-R cognitive social
simulation capability is then described. The approach relies on
the use of a variety of custom ACT-R modules and memory-
resident Lisp databases. The custom modules enable ACT-R
agents to exchange information with each other during the course
of their sensemaking activities. The Lisp databases, in contrast,
are used to store information about communicative transactions,
the experimental setup and the structure of the communication
network. The proposed solution provides the basic elements
required to run cognitive social simulation experiments into
collective sensemaking using the ACT-R architecture; however,
further work needs to be undertaken in order to address a
number of limitations associated with agent communication
capabilities and the ability of agents to interact with the task
environment.
Keywords–collective cognition; sensemaking; distributed cogni-
tion; team sensemaking; cognitive architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the
socially-distributed or socially-situated nature of human cog-
nition across a number of scientiﬁc disciplines [1][2][3][4][5].
Cognitive processes that were typically studied at the level
of individual agents, such as memory, are now being re-
examined within a more social context [6], and increasing
attention is being paid to the factors that enable groups to
function as the processors of information [7]. This interest
in the social dimension of cognition is, in part, a reﬂection
of the growing popularity of embodied, extended and situ-
ated approaches within the sciences of the mind [8][9][10].
However, the research is also motivated by an attempt to
engineer systems that harness the collective cognitive potential
of groups of individuals. The advent of global information
and communication networks, such as the World Wide Web,
has clearly been one of the drivers in such research; however,
systems that support socially-distributed cognition are also
important in more restricted organizational contexts. This is
particularly so as advances in sensor technology lead to a
signiﬁcant expansion in the scale and scope of available data
assets. As organizations move into this ‘Big Data’ era, so they
are under increasing pressure to distribute cognitive effort and
harness the collective cognitive potential of their workforces.
In order to improve our understanding of the factors that
affect the performance of teams of individuals, researchers
have relied on the use of both human experimental studies
and multi-agent simulation techniques. Multi-agent simulation
techniques are of particular interest given the efﬁciency with
which experimental studies can be undertaken and the control
that can be exerted over experimental factors of interest. How-
ever, while such techniques have proven useful in investigating
a number of social psychological phenomena, most notably
social inﬂuence [11], they have sometimes been criticized in
terms of their cognitive sophistication and ﬁdelity. Recently,
Sun [12] has advocated the use of cognitive architectures in
multi-agent simulation as a means of improving the cognitive
sophistication of agent implementations and enhancing the
ﬁdelity of computational models of human social behavior.
Cognitive architectures are frameworks that make particular
commitments about the kind of mental representations and
computational procedures that are sufﬁcient to explain im-
portant aspects of human cognition, such as problem solving,
memory and learning [13]. Although a cognitive architecture
can be implemented using connectionist schemes, some of
the most inﬂuential cognitive architectures, such as ACT-R
(Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational) [14][15] and SOAR
(State, Operator and Result) [16][17] rely on rule and symbol
forms of processing. Of particular note is ACT-R, which
has been the focus of a sustained research and development
effort for more than 30 years and which has been used to
model cognitive performance in a wide variety of experimental
settings. The integration of cognitive architectures into social
simulation results in what Sun [12] refers to as cognitive social
simulation.
By incorporating cognitive architectures into multi-agent
simulations, we are provided with the opportunity to study the
interaction between social and cognitive factors; for example,we can study the effect that different cognitive factors (such
as memory decay rates, learning rates, attention, and so on)
have on aspects of collective performance. Cognitive archi-
tectures thus enrich the range of experimental opportunities
that are open to investigators. In addition, because cognitive
architectures provide a framework for detailed cognitive mod-
eling, cognitive social simulations may yield results of greater
predictive validity compared to multi-agent simulations that
assume only rudimentary cognition on the part of agents.
This paper describes an ongoing effort to use ACT-R
as a platform for cognitive social simulation in respect of
a particular form of socially-distributed cognition, namely
collective sensemaking. Following a brief overview of ACT-
R in Section II, a speciﬁc sensemaking task is described in
Section III. This sensemaking task has been the focus of pre-
vious experimental work (involving both human and synthetic
agents), and it has been used to advance our understanding
of the factors that affect performance in team-based situations.
These features make the task particularly attractive as a starting
point for the current modeling and software development
effort. Section IV describes the implementation of an ACT-
R agent that can perform the aforementioned sensemaking
task, and Section V outlines the approach taken with respect
to the implementation of a multi-agent simulation capability
in ACT-R. This multi-agent simulation capability serves as the
basis for performing cognitive social simulations in ACT-R. In
particular, it establishes the basis for future experimental work
that can systematically vary factors at the cognitive, social,
technological, and informational levels in order to observe the
effect of these factors on collective cognitive performance.
Section VI outlines areas of further work that are needed to
support these experimental efforts.
The main aims of the current paper are to 1) present an
ACT-R cognitive model that be used to perform a sensemaking
task, and 2) illustrate how the ACT-R model can be exploited
in the context of cognitive social simulations via the use of
extensions to the core ACT-R architecture. The paper also
describes one means by which sensemaking capabilities can be
implemented in ACT-R by adopting conventional knowledge
engineering techniques. The main contributions of this work
are to advance our understanding of how to model distributed
cognitive processes using a popular pre-existing cognitive ar-
chitecture, namely ACT-R. Such models serve as an important
focus for experimental work that seeks to predict and explain
the impact of social, technological and psychological factors
on team-level performance.
II. ACT-R
Sun [12, p. 33] deﬁnes a cognitive architecture as “a
domain-generic computational cognitive model that captures
essential structures and processes of the individual mind for
the purpose of a broad (multiple domain) analysis of cognition
and behaviour”. A cognitive architecture is thus a framework
that captures some of the relatively invariant features of the
human cognitive system – those features that are deemed to
be more-or-less constant across domains, tasks and individuals.
One example here would be the mechanisms that support the
storage and retrieval of information from long-term memory.
Although a number of features of the task environment may
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Figure 1: The core modules of the ACT-R v.6 cognitive architecture.
affect the ability of subjects to recall information, the mech-
anisms that actually realize the recall process are unlikely to
change from one task to another.
ACT-R is one of a number of cognitive architectures
that have been used for cognitive modeling [14][15]. It is
primarily a symbolic cognitive architecture in that it features
the use of symbolic representations and explicit production
rules; however, it also makes use of a number of subsymbolic
processes that contribute to aspects of performance [15].
ACT-R consists of a number of modules (see Figure 1),
each of which is devoted to processing a particular kind
of information. Each module is associated with a capacity-
constrained buffer that can contain a single item of informa-
tion, called a chunk. The modules are assumed to access and
deposit information in the buffers, and coordination between
the modules is achieved by a centralized production system
module – the procedural module – that can respond to the
contents of the buffers and change buffer contents (via the
execution of production rules). Importantly, the procedural
module can only respond to the contents of the buffers;
it cannot participate in the internal encapsulated activity of
modules, although it can inﬂuence such processes. As shown
in Figure 1, there are eight core modules in the latest version
of ACT-R:
 Input and Output Modules. There are four in-
put/output modules (Visual, Aural, Vocal and Man-
ual). These provide support for modeling agent-world
interactions.
 Goal Module. Actions within ACT-R are often depen-
dant upon the current goal being pursued. The goal
module is a specialized form of memory, with its own
buffer, and it stores the current state of these goals.
 Imaginal Module. The imaginal module is responsi-
ble for manipulating intermediate representations of a
problem when working towards a goal. For example,
when calculating x in x   4 = 7, the intermediate
stage x = 7+4 can be stored in the imaginal module
before being evaluated. Declarative Module. This module implements the
memory system of the agent. It stores information in
the form of chunks, each of which is associated with
activation levels.
 Procedural Module. The procedural module is re-
sponsible for coordinating between the other modules.
It contains rules that ﬁre in response to the contents
of the module buffers. The contents of the various
modules are typically changed as a result of rule
execution.
These modules (and their associated buffers) tend to form
the basis of most ACT-R models. Cognitive modelers are not,
however, restricted to the use of these modules, and new
modules can be added to implement additional functionality.
As an example of this kind of extension of the default ACT-R
architecture, Rodgers et al. [18] added a total of nine buffers
to the ACT-R architecture as part of their effort to implement
a situation model (corresponding to a “mental model of the
objects, events, actions, and relationships encountered in a
complex task simulation” [18, p. 313]).
The ACT-R architecture has been used to model human
cognitive performance in a wide variety of experimental con-
texts. It has generated ﬁndings of predictive and explana-
tory relevance to hundreds of phenomena encountered in the
cognitive psychology and human factors literature, and this
has earned it a reputation as the cognitive architecture that
is probably the “best grounded in the experimental research
literature” [19, p. 24]. ACT-R has also been used to model
performance in a range of complex task settings. For example,
ACT-R has been used to model driver behavior [20], including
the effects of concurrent activities (such as cell phone usage)
[21] and sleep deprivation on driver performance [22]. These
features make ACT-R a compelling target for cognitive social
simulation. To date, however, very few studies have sought to
apply ACT-R to situations involving socially-distributed infor-
mation processing (recently, however, Reitter and Lebiere [23]
have demonstrated the use of ACT-R in a social information
foraging task). The aim of the current work is to develop
a generic framework for using ACT-R in cognitive social
simulation experiments, and to then apply this framework to
a particular kind of socially-distributed cognitive processing,
namely collective sensemaking.
III. COLLECTIVE SENSEMAKING AND THE ELICIT
FRAMEWORK
Sensemaking has been the focus of sustained research
attention over the past 10-20 years [24][25][26][27]. It has
been deﬁned as a “motivated, continuous effort to understand
connections (which can be among people, places, and events)
in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” [24].
Sensemaking is clearly something that individuals engage in
as part of their attempt to explain and predict the features of
some object, event or situation. This does not mean, however,
that sensemaking is only something that individuals engage in.
There is, in fact, a growing appreciation of the prevalence and
importance of what might be called ‘collective sensemaking’
[3] or ‘team sensemaking’ [28], namely, the activities that are
performed by groups of individuals in order to develop under-
standing at both the individual and collective levels. Collective
sensemaking is a phenomenon of considerable importance in a
number of different task contexts, such as intelligence analysis
[25][29], military planning [30] and healthcare provision [31],
and it is deemed to be of generic relevance to the problem-
solving capabilities of military coalition organizations [3]. This
highlights the importance of collective sensemaking as a focus
area for cognitive social simulation experiments.
In order to support the effort to develop an ACT-R frame-
work to study issues in collective sensemaking, it helps to have
a concrete example of a sensemaking task on which to focus.
For the purposes of this exercise, a particular sensemaking task
was selected called the ELICIT sensemaking task. ELICIT, in
this case, is an acronym that stands for the Experimental Lab-
oratory for Investigating Collaboration, Information Sharing
and Trust. It denotes an ongoing effort to provide a common
experimental framework to investigate issues in group-level
problem-solving [32]. The ELICIT sensemaking task is a
particular activity that is performed by subjects within the
context of the ELICIT framework. In essence, the task involves
the selective presentation of information items – called factoids
– to experimental subjects. Each factoid provides a limited
amount of information about a situation, and the aim of the
subject is to assimilate enough information in order to make a
decision regarding the features of an impending terrorist attack
(these features are typically referred to as the dimensions of the
sensemaking task). The particular features the subject needs to
resolve are as follows:
 who: the group that will attempt to perform the attack
 where: the country in which the attack will take place
 what: the kind of target the attack will be against (e.g.,
an army base)
 when: the date and time of the attack
A number of studies have been undertaken with different
factoid sets (i.e., collections of factoids) in order to investigate
the factors that affect performance in this task (e.g., [33]). A
synthetic agent has also been developed to support multi-agent
simulations involving the ELICIT sensemaking task [34]. This
agent is, however, not based on a cognitive architecture, and
it does not therefore provide access to the kinds of cognitive
parameters that ACT-R makes available (e.g., the ability to run
simulations in which agents use different cognitive strategies
or possess different mnemonic capabilities).
One of the main advantages of the ELICIT sensemaking
task is that it provides access to collections of factoids that have
been used in a variety of experimental studies. This supports
the attempt to develop a cognitive model in ACT-R because the
factoids provide insight into the kind of knowledge structures
that an agent needs in order to solve the designated problem.
In addition, the availability of empirical results from previous
studies (particularly those with human subjects) enables us to
compare the performance of the model and assess how the
results differ from those obtained with human subjects.
The ﬁrst 10 factoids from one particular ELICIT factoid
set (namely ‘factoidset4aGMU’) are shown in Table I (there
are 68 factoids in the full factoid set). As can be seen from
this subset of factoids, each factoid provides information about
the entities and relationships associated with the situation, andAgent 
activity-level: activity-level-type-value 
attacks-on-sabbath: evaluation-type-value 
name: STRING 
preferred-time-of-attack: day-night-type-value 
prefers-unprotected-targets: evaluation-type-value 
is-suicide-bomber: evaluation-type-value 
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is-land-locked: evaluation-type-value 
name: STRING 
locals-being-recruited: evaluation-type-value 
 
Figure 2: Part of the domain schema for the ELICIT ‘factoidset4aGMU’ factoidset, focusing on the Country and Agent concepts.
TABLE I: Subset of factoids from one of the factoid sets (namely
‘factoidset4aGMU’) used in ELICIT experiments. The characters in the
‘Type’ column specify the type of the factoid: E = Essential, K = Key, S =
Supportive and N = Noise.
# Type Factoid
1 E The Gray and Teal groups do not employ suicide
bombers
2 E There will be a suicide bomber attack at a school
3 E The Silver group does not work in Pi
4 E The Silver group only attacks during the day
5 N The Rose group may be involved
6 K The Sienna and Rose groups only target the military
7 S Reports from the Teal group indicate standard levels of
activity
8 N There is a lot of activity involving the Rose group
9 N The Gray group is recruiting locals – intentions un-
known
10 K The Turquoise group focuses on destroying energy
infrastructure
at least some of these factoids support inferences that enable
particular kinds of suspect entities (e.g., groups, countries and
targets) to be eliminated. An example is provided by factoids
1 and 2 from Table I. Factoid 2 states that the impending
attack will be a suicide bombing attack, and we learn from
factoid 1 that Gray and Teal groups do not employ suicide
bombing tactics. As a result of being presented with these two
pieces of information, we can infer that neither the Gray nor
the Teal group can be involved in the attack, and they can
thus be eliminated from our list of suspect groups. We can
also see from Table I that factoids come in four basic types:
essential, key, supportive and noise [32] (these are indicated
by the letters ‘E’, ‘K’, ‘S’, and ‘N’ in Table I). Expert and
key factoids provide important information that is relevant
to the process of resolving the who, what, when and where
aspects of the task; supportive factoids provide information
that tends to support the information contained in the key
and essential factoids; and noise factoids contribute nothing
to an agent’s ability to solve the problem – the problem can
be solved even if these factoids are ignored. In a typical
ELICIT experiment, subsets of factoids are distributed to the
members of an analysis team, and the proﬁle of factoid sharing
is controlled to mimic the features of different organizational
environments. For example, the communication network can
be conﬁgured so as to investigate the impact of hierarchically
structured versus decentralized military command structures
[33].
In order to support the development of a simulation capa-
bility in which ACT-R agents can process the ELICIT factoids
and solve the sensemaking problem, a knowledge analysis of
the ELICIT factoid set ‘factoidset4aGMU’ was undertaken.
This analysis was performed in order to better understand the
conceptual structures that were required by an agent tasked
with processing the ELICIT factoids and to also enumerate
the various inferences that were supported by each of the
factoids. This analysis yielded a knowledge model that was
represented using the modeling formalisms associated with
the CommonKADS methodology [35]. Part of the domain
schema associated with the knowledge model is illustrated in
Figure 2 using UML (Uniﬁed Modeling Language) notation
[36]. It highlights some of the properties and relationships
that exist between two of the main components of the situation
model, namely ‘Agent’ (a supertype of ‘Group’) and ‘Country’.
The knowledge analysis also yielded a knowledge base that
contained all of the rules necessary to support factoid-related
reasoning. In particular, the rules captured the essential infer-
ences that were necessary to progressively eliminate suspect
entities and identify the who (group), where (country) what
(target) and when (month, day, hour) of the terrorist attack.
One of these rules is shown in Figure 3. The rule, in this case,
implements the inference that groups using suicide bombing
tactics cannot be involved in an attack that is known to be a
suicide bombing attack.
It is important to note that although the nature of the
inferences associated with the processing of ELICIT factoids
can seem straightforward, as is exempliﬁed by the rule in
Figure 3, the problem-solving process itself is by no means
simple from the perspective of a human subject. The number of
factoids to be processed (N = 68) imposes a heavy cognitive
burden on the subjects. In addition, the subjects have no way
of knowing at the outset of the process which factoids are
relevant (key and essential factoids) as opposed to those that
are not (i.e., the noise factoids). The number of suspect entities
in each dimension of the problem also creates difﬁculties.attack.is-suicide-bombing-attack = yes AND
group.is-suicide-bomber = no
IMPLIES
group.is-involved = no
Figure 3: An example of a rule that resulted from a knowledge analysis of
the ELICIT factoidset.
In total there are 7 groups, 5 countries, and 8 target types
mentioned in the factoids, any of which could be involved in
the attack. The result is that even when supportive cognitive
artefacts are used (e.g., paper and paper) the challenge of
identifying the correct suspect entities can seem formidable,
and not all human subjects are able to solve the problem.
Partly as a result of this complexity, it was difﬁcult to validate
the integrity of the aforementioned knowledge model in terms
of its scope and accuracy. In fact, it is by no means clear
simply by looking at all the rules in the knowledge base
whether a reasoning system that implemented all the rules
would be able to derive the correct solution to the problem. In
order to evaluate this, a reasoning system was developed using
the CLIPS (C Language Integrated Production System) expert
system shell [37] (the CommonKADS knowledge model, in
this case, served as a speciﬁcation for the CLIPS-based im-
plementation). This implementation effort served to identify
a number of shortcomings in the original knowledge model
speciﬁcation. One particular shortcoming relates to factoid 51,
which reads ‘Sigma has closed all its schools’. This factoid is
actually intended to rule out Sigma (a country) as a suspect
entity. Given that we know an attack will be against a school
(factoid 2), we know that a country must contain schools in
order for it to be a suspect. The problem with factoid 51, in
this case, is that the closure of schools is intended to mean
that there are no schools in Sigma that are viable targets. The
original (CommonKADS) knowledge model assumed that a
country was a suspect entity irrespective of whether the targets
located within that country were ‘open’ or ‘closed’. This error
perhaps serves to highlight one of the shortcomings of the
current ELICIT factoid sets: they require subjects to make
particular kinds of interpretations; however, not all of these
interpretations are enforced by the semantics of the statements
themselves. Obviously, further work is required to investigate
this issue. Ideally, one would like the ACT-R agent to interpret
factoids in the same way as human subjects, and thus one
strategy could be to modify the text of the factoid statements
in order to reduce semantic ambiguity. A second strategy
could involve an effort to record the kinds of interpretational
errors humans make when reading the sentences and then
ensure that ACT-R agents make the same sort of errors with
similar frequency. In both cases, one can imagine collecting
the required data with questionnaires that present each of the
factoids and solicit input from respondents in the form of (for
example) multiple choices.
IV. INSTANTIATION OF AN ACT-R AGENT FOR
INDIVIDUAL SENSEMAKING
In order to develop an ACT-R system to investigate collec-
tive sensemaking, it is necessary to develop an ACT-R cogni-
tive model that implements the sensemaking process itself. In
the present case, it is necessary to develop a cognitive model
that can process each of the factoids in the aforementioned
factoid set, build a mental model of the prospective situation,
and then engage in reasoning processes that progressively
eliminate suspect entities. In fact, this is just a minimum
requirement. ACT-R is intended to model human cognitive
processes in a way that is cognitively realistic. This means that
an ACT-R sensemaking agent should not just be able to reason
over the ELICIT factoids, it should also do so in a way that
mimics the strategies adopted by human agents: this is what
enables us to gain an explanatory and predictive toehold over
human performance in particular experimental contexts. For
the purposes of the current modeling and development effort,
this constraint was relaxed, and the aim of simply developing a
cognitive model that could solve the ELICIT sensemaking task
was adopted. The motivation for this departure from standard
cognitive modeling practice was based on a number of factors.
Firstly, a cursory analysis of a small sample of human indi-
viduals (N = 3) engaged in the sensemaking task revealed a
variety of different strategies. A notable difference was the way
in which subjects made use of external resources, particularly
pencil and paper. These enabled subjects to create paper-
based lists and tables that were modiﬁed as each sentence
was encountered. These bio-external representations appeared
to function as cognitive aids in the problem-solving process,
serving as a durable trace of task-relevant information (e.g.,
reminders as to which groups were not involved in the attack).
This suggests that there may not be a uniform way to solve
the ELICIT problem, and multiple kinds of model may be
required depending on the nature of the task environment that
subjects are confronted with (e.g., the kinds of representations
and visualizations that are made available by a computer
interface). Practical issues also governed the decision not to
engage in detailed cognitive modeling for the purposes of this
initial development effort. The primary goal of the current
activity is to develop an experimental simulation capability
that can accommodate multiple cognitive agents (i.e., agents
that incorporate at least some of the constraints, characteristics
and limitations associated with the human cognitive system).
The details of the actual cognitive processing performed by the
agents is largely irrelevant to this development effort, although
it is clearly an important focus of attention when simulation
experiments are being performed.
As with all ACT-R models, the implementation of the
ELICIT sensemaking process in ACT-R draws on the use
of production rules that match against the contents of the
buffers associated with each of the ACT-R modules (see
Figure 1). For the purposes of testing the cognitive model,
chunks encoding the information content of each of the factoid
statements were pre-loaded into declarative memory using the
ACT-R (add-dm) command. This meant that agents were
not required to engage in low-level perceptual processing of
the factoid statements, neither were they required to engage
in the linguistic analysis of those statements. Instead, the
agents began the simulation having effectively ‘memorized’
all the facts implied by the factoids. Although this is clearly
unrealistic relative to the kind of experimental contexts in
which the ELICIT task has been investigated, it constituted an
important simplifying assumption in the context of the early
stages of the modeling effort. In particular, it was important to
avoid a situation where assumptions were being made about
the speciﬁc nature of the task environment (e.g., computer
interfaces and communication equipment) that would then
inﬂuence the modeling effort. In addition, the implementationAgent 
activity-level: activity-level-type-value 
attacks-on-sabbath: evaluation-type-value 
name: STRING 
preferred-time-of-attack: day-night-type-value 
prefers-unprotected-targets: evaluation-type-value 
is-suicide-bomber: evaluation-type-value 
works-with-locals: evaluation-type-value 
is-involved: evaluation-type-value 
Individual  Group 
uses-small-cells: evaluation-type-value 
<< born-in 
has-blood-tie >> 
<< operates-in 
<<  does-not-operate-in 
is-member-of >> 
<< has-member 
Country 
is-coalition-country: evaluation-type-value 
is-land-locked: evaluation-type-value 
name: STRING 
locals-being-recruited: evaluation-type-value 
 
Figure 2. Part of the domain schema for the ELICIT ‘factoidset4aGMU’ factoidset, focusing on the Country and Agent concepts.
can imagine collecting the required data with questionnaires
that present each of the factoids and then solicit input from
the respondent in the form of (e.g.) multiple choices.
IV. INSTANTIATION OF AN ACT-R AGENT FOR
INDIVIDUAL SENSEMAKING
Listing 2. One of 124 productions that enables ACT-R to solve the ELICIT
sensemaking task.
(P evaluate-group-suicide-bombing-tactics-3
=goal>
isa sensemaking-goal
selected-dimension who
status evaluate-property
selected-object =object
target-attribute is-suicide-bomber
=imaginal>
isa statement
object =object
attribute is-suicide-bomber
value no
=retrieval>
isa statement
object attack
attribute is-suicide-bombing
value yes
==>
+imaginal>
isa statement
object =object
attribute is-suspect
value no
source self
=goal>
status check-suspect-status
)
As with all ACT-R models, the implementation of the
ELICIT sensemaking process in ACT-R draws on the use of
production rules that match against the contents of the buffers
associated with each of the ACT-R modules (see Figure 1).
For the purposes of this exercise, the facts associated with
each of the factoid statements was pre-loaded into declarative
memory using the ACT-R (add-dm) command. This meant
that agents were not required to engage in low-level perceptual
processing of the factoid statements; neither were they required
to engage in the linguistic analysis of those statements. Instead,
the agent began the simulation having effectively ‘memorized’
all the facts implied by the factoids. Although this is clearly
unrealistic relative to the kind of experimental contexts in
which the ELICIT task has been investigated, it constituted
an important simplifying assumption in the context of the
modeling effort. In particular, it was important to avoid a
situation where assumptions were being made about the spe-
ciﬁc nature of the task environment (e.g., computer interfaces
and communication equipment) that would then inﬂuence the
modeling effort. In addition, the implementation of simulated
perceptual processing and agent-world interaction mechanisms
would have served to complicate what was already a challeng-
ing modeling activity.
TABLE II. DESCRIPTION OF THE SLOTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE
STATEMENT CHUNK TYPE.
Slot Description
object Contains the name of an object that features as part of
a situation model.
attribute Contains the name of an attribute associated with the
object named in the ‘object’ slot.
value Contains the value of the attribute named in the ‘at-
tribute’ slot.
is-true Indicates whether the statement made about the object
in question is true or false.
rdf-triple Contains an RDF triple representation of the statement.
This slot is not used at the present time.
nl-string Contains a natural language representation of the state-
ment. This is the string that is communicated by agents.
source Speciﬁes the source of the statement. This could be
the name of a particular agent, the name of a physical
information source, such as a sensor, or the name of an
information repository. In cases where the statement
exists as the result of an inference made by the agent,
the value of the slot will be self.
The result of the modeling effort was an ACT-R cognitive
model capable of solving the ELICIT sensemaking task. As
with all ACT-R models, the key components of the model
are the various chunk-types3, chunks and rules used as part
of the solution. The main chunk-type for the model is the
statement chunk-type:
3A chunk-type provides a template for a chunk, in the same way that a
class provides a template for the data structure of an object.
Figure 4: One of 124 productions that enables an ACT-R agent to solve the
ELICIT sensemaking task.
of simulated perceptual processing and agent-world interac-
tion mechanisms would have served to complicate what was
already a challenging modeling activity.
The result of the modeling effort was an ACT-R cognitive
model capable of solving the ELICIT sensemaking task. As
with all ACT-R models, the key components of the model are
the various chunk-types, chunks and production rules used as
part of the solution. A chunk-type, in this case, speciﬁes the
structure of a chunk in terms of the slots that it can contain (a
chunk-type essentially provides a template for a chunk, in the
same way that a class in object-oriented programming provides
a template for the data structure of an object). The main chunk-
type for the model is the statement chunk-type:
(chunk-type statement
object
attribute
value
(is-true yes)
(source self)
(confidence 100))
The statement chunk-type represents a basic fact about
the sensemaking situation, which is captured as an <object,
attribute, value> triple, similar to the triples seen in
the Resource Description Framework [38]. The chunk type
contains a number of slots, the most of important of which are
the object, attribute and value slots. The function of
these and other slots is described in Table II.
Aside from chunk-types, the model contained a total of
124 production rules, one of which is shown in Figure 4. Rule
execution was controlled by task state information that was
stored in the ACT-R goal buffer. In particular, the process of
evaluating and eliminating suspect entities was decomposed
TABLE II: Description of the slots associated with the statement
chunk-type.
Slot Description
object Contains the name of an object that features as part of
a situation model.
attribute Contains the name of an attribute associated with the
object named in the ‘object’ slot.
value Contains the value of the attribute named in the ‘at-
tribute’ slot.
is-true Indicates whether the statement made about the object
in question is true (yes) or false (no) (default is yes).
source Speciﬁes the source of the statement. This could be
the name of a particular agent, the name of a physical
information source, such as a sensor, or the name of an
information repository. In cases where the statement
exists as the result of an inference made by the agent,
the value of the slot will be self (this is the default
value).
conﬁdence Indicates the level of conﬁdence the agent has in the
truth or falsity of the statement. A value of 100 (default)
indicates maximum conﬁdence, whereas a value of 0
indicates no conﬁdence. At present, this slot is not used
as part of the reasoning process; however, it could be
used in experiments that aim to study the inﬂuence
of uncertainty on processes at both the individual and
collective (team) levels.
into a number of inference steps, which are illustrated in
Figure 5 and described in Table III. These inference steps
correspond to particular stages in the larger reasoning process,
and each one is associated with a particular subset of rules.
By recording which inference step is ‘active’ at any given
time, an agent can track its progress and limit the number of
rules that can apply. The rule depicted in Figure 4 exempliﬁes
this: the rule features a conditional element that matches to
the status slot of a sensemaking-goal chunk that is
contained in the goal buffer. This rule can only be selected for
execution when the value of the attribute slot corresponds
to ‘evaluate-property’, and this identiﬁes one of the inference
steps associated with the larger reasoning process (see Figure
5).
Together, the productions work to enable an ACT-R agent
to eliminate suspects and yield the correct answer to the
ELICIT sensemaking puzzle. Using a PC with an Intel Quad
Core 2.93 GHz processor, 3 GB of RAM and running a 64-bit
version of Windows 7, the entire process runs in a simulated
time of 16.25 seconds. This, of course, in no way resembles the
performance of human subjects in actual experimental contexts
– the human subjects take much longer to ﬁnd the solution to
the problem. This serves to highlight the fact that the assump-
tions made by the current model (e.g., perfect initial memory of
all facts, adoption of a robust suspect elimination strategy, and
knowledge about what evaluative criteria to apply to each kind
of suspect entity) do not apply to the situation seen in many
of the experimental studies performed in the context of the
ELICIT framework. An additional concern relates to the use
of a variety of Lisp functions in order to realize the reasoning
process. Although not shown in Figure 4, some of the rules rely
on the use of ‘!bind!’ and ‘!eval!’ evaluations in order to invoke
Lisp functions. As is noted by the ACT-R 6.0 reference manual
[39, p. 165], the use of ‘!bind!’ and ‘!eval!’ in these situations
may cause the model to depart from ACT-R theory, and it also
creates potential problems for ACT-R’s production compilation
or rule learning mechanism. In spite of these shortcomings, the
ACT-R model presented here does provide a working examplesolved? 
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Figure 5: Activity diagram showing the inference steps implemented by an
ACT-R agent engaged in the ELICIT sensemaking task.
of how a process previously glossed as sensemaking [34] can
be implemented in a cognitive architecture that incorporates
the kinds of constraints and characteristics presumed to apply
in the case of human cognition.
V. AN ACT-R FRAMEWORK FOR COGNITIVE SOCIAL
SIMULATION
In order to use ACT-R as a platform for cognitive social
simulation, a number of extensions were made to the core
ACT-R architecture. The most important extension, from the
perspective of cognitive social simulation, relates to the cre-
ation of a specialized ‘messaging’ module that enables agents
to exchange text messages with other agents. The messaging
module features two buffers: ‘send-message’ and ‘receive-
message’. The send-message buffer enables agents to post a
message to other agents in the simulation, while the receive-
message buffer enables agents to check for unread messages
and retrieve any messages that are available. A memory-
resident Lisp database – the ‘message database’ – is used to
store all the messages sent by agents, and the messaging mod-
ule interfaces with this database to both create new messages
and retrieve existing ones. Together, the messaging module and
the message database implement the capability for agents to
communicate with one another as part of a socially-distributed,
collaborative problem-solving process.
The messages that get communicated by agents are repre-
sented by particular kinds of chunks, called message chunks.
These chunks contain the following slots:
 source: Speciﬁes the name of the agent that posted
the message.
 target: Speciﬁes the intended target of the message.
If the value of this slot is ‘any’, the message will
TABLE III: Stages of the reasoning process that are implemented by the
ACT-R cognitive model designed to solve the ELICIT sensemaking task.
Name Description
CHECK-
SOLUTION
Determines whether the sensemaking problem has
been solved, i.e., whether the who, what, when and
where dimensions of the sensemaking task have
been resolved.
SELECT-
DIMENSION
Selects one of the dimensions (who, what, when
or where) of the sensemaking task to focus on.
SELECT-
SUSPECT
Selects a particular suspect entity (e.g., a particular
group) to focus on.
SELECT-
PROPERTY
Selects a particular property (e.g., ‘is-suicide-
bomber’) of the selected suspect entity to evaluate.
RETRIEVE-
PROPERTY
Retrieves information about the selected property
from declarative memory.
EVALUATE-
PROPERTY
Evaluates the information retrieved from memory
and assesses whether the suspect status of the
selected entity should be modiﬁed.
CHECK-
SUSPECT-STATUS
Determines whether the selected suspect entity is
still a suspect following evaluation of the property
retrieved in the ‘RETRIEVE-PROPERTY’ infer-
ence step.
IDENTIFY-
SUSPECT
Assesses whether a particular suspect entity (e.g.,
a particular group) for a particular dimension (e.g.,
who dimension) can be identiﬁed. If so, the agent
will proceed to select a different dimension to
focus on. If not, another suspect entity will be
selected until all suspect entities of a particular
type have been evaluated. At this time, control
passes back to the ‘SELECT-DIMENSION’ infer-
ence step.
be posted to any agent that the originating agent
can communicate with based on the structure of the
communication network (see below).
 text: Speciﬁes the text of the message to be commu-
nicated.
Whenever a message chunk is asserted in the send-
message buffer as a result of rule execution, the messaging
module ﬁrst determines whether the target agent is a peer
of the originating agent (this information is stored in an-
other memory-resident Lisp database, called the ‘connection
database’). If this is the case, the messaging module will
create a new record in the message database that reﬂects the
information content of the message chunk. All such records
are initially marked as ‘unread’, reﬂecting the fact that they
have not been processed by the intended recipient.
Whenever an agent wants to retrieve new messages from
the database, they can make a request to the receive-message
buffer. This will cause the messaging module to check the
message database for any unread messages that have been
posted to the agent. If any such messages are available, one of
the messages will be retrieved and a new message chunk will
be created in the receive-message buffer. The manner in which
unread messages are selected from the database can be con-
trolled by a particular parameter, called the ‘message-selection-
mode’ parameter, which is associated with the messaging
module (for example, the most recently posted messages can
be selected by setting the message-selection-mode parameter
to ‘newest’.). Figure 6 presents two production rules that
exemplify the process of sending and receiving messages via
the buffers of the messaging module.
Once a message is available in the receive-message buffer,
the agent needs to interpret the message and translate the
contents of the message into one or more of the statementmessage database for any unread messages that have posted
to the agent. If any unread messages are available, one of
the messages will be retrieved and a new message chunk
will be returned to the receive-message buffer. The manner
in which unread messages are selected from the database
can be controlled by a parameter, called ‘message-selection-
mode’, which is associated with the messaging module (e.g.,
the most recently posted message can be selected by setting
the message-selection-mode parameter to ‘newest’.). Figure
??? presents a number of production rules that exemplify the
process of sending and receiving messages via the buffers of
the messaging module.
Listing 1. One of 124 productions that enables ACT-R to solve the ELICIT
sensemaking task.
(p retrieve-unread-messages
=goal>
isa sensemaking-goal
task process-messages
?receive-message>
unread true
buffer empty
==>
+receive-message>
isa message
)
(p interpret-and-send-received-message
=goal>
isa sensemaking-goal
task process-messages
=receive-message>
isa message
text =text
?send-message>
state free
buffer empty
==>
+parse-message> =receive-message
+send-message>
isa message
text =text
target any
)
Once a message is available in the receive-message buffer,
the agent needs to interpret the message and translate the
contents of the message into one or more of the statement
chunks that were presented in Section ???. In order to accom-
plish this, the agent makes use of a second module, called the
language-comprehension module. Like the messaging module,
this module is also a custom module that does not form part
of the core ACT-R architecture (see Figure 1). The language
module exposes a single buffer, called ‘parse-message’ that
can receive message chunks, ‘interpret’ the text content of
the message chunks (i.e., the text contained in the ‘text’
slot), and create statement chunks reﬂecting the information
content of the message. At the present time, the interpreta-
tion process consists involves a simple string-based pattern
matching mechanism; however, more sophisticated forms of
language processing could be explored in future work. The
language module makes the results of the interpretation process
available to the agent by using the (add-dm) to assert the
statement chunks directly into memory. This means that the
information content of any messages passed to the language
module can be accessed by the agent by making retrieval
requests to its declarative memory module. The use of the
(add-dm) command in this context accommodates situations
in which multiple statement chunks must be asserted to reﬂect
the factual content of a message – there is not necessarily a
one-to-one mapping between messages that contain the text
of a factoid and a statement chunk that reﬂects the semantic
content of the factoid. In situations where the language module
fails to match the text message to an existing pattern, no new
statements are created – this might be considered to correspond
to a failure of interpretation.
Aside from the message database, the current framework
for cognitive social simulation using ACT-R incorporates a
number of additional databases. Two of these are shown
in Figure 6. The connection database is used to deﬁne the
structure of the communication network that exists between
agents. The database contains records (created in advance
of simulation execution) that specify the direct channels of
communication that exist between agents. This database is
queried by the messaging module to determine whether an
originating agent can post a message to a particular target
agent. The triple database is used to store general information
about the experimental simulation. For example, the database
can be used to store information about the number of agents
to create, the properties of agents, the factoid set to use, the
duration of the experiment, and so on.
VI. LIMITATIONS & FUTURE WORK
The approach described in Section V yields a system in
which multiple ACT-R agents, each associated with a distinct
cognitive model can engage in the sort of reasoning process
described in Section IV. Each agent can thus engage in
sensemaking in parallel with other agents. In contrast with
the situation in Section IV there is no need to represent all
of the factoid-related information in memory at the outset of
the simulation (e.g., using the ACT-R (add-dm) command).
Instead, agents can be provided with an initial set of factoids
at the outset of the experiments (by placing creating messages
in the message database), and then additional factoids can
be presented as the simulation progresses (either as a result
of a centralized information distribution mechanism, or, more
interestingly, as a result of agents posting messages to each
other via their respective messaging modules). As such, this
system implements the basic requirements of a system de-
signed to support the execution of cognitive social simulation
experiments: each of the agents engages in a sensemaking pro-
cess and is also able to communicate task-relevant information
to other agents at speciﬁc junctures in the problem-solving
process. As it stands, however, the current system possesses
a number of limitations, and these are the focus of future
development efforts. These limitations include the following:
• Question/Answering Capabilities. At present, ACT-
R agents can only communicate factual information to
each other; they cannot pose questions for their peers
to answer. In order to support question/answering
capabilities in the context of the current approach,
agents need to be able to 1) recognize the conditions
under which a question should be asked, 2) formulate
the question in a way that other agents can understand,
3) post the question to other agents in their social
network and 4) recognize what information is being
sought by a question posed by another agent. Of
Figure 6: Two production rules that exemplify the use of the messaging
module to send and receive messages via the send-message and
receive-message buffers. The request to the parse-message buffer in the
‘interpret-and-send-received-message’ rule causes the language module to
interpret the received message and create statement chunks in the agent’s
declarative memory module (see main text for details).
chunks that were described in Section IV. In order to ac-
complish this, the agent makes use of a second module,
called the ‘language’ module. Like the messaging module,
this module is a new custom module that does not form part
of the core ACT-R architecture (see Figure 1). The language
module exposes a single buffer, called ‘parse-message’ that
can receive message chunks, ‘interpret’ the text content of
the chunks (i.e., the text contained in the text slot of the
message chunk), and create statement chunks reﬂecting
the information content of the message. At the present time, the
interpretation process is a simple one involving a string-based
pattern matching mechanism. The language module makes the
results of the interpretation process available to the agent by
using the (add-dm) command to assert the statement
chunks directly into the agent’s declarative memory module.
This means that the information content of any messages
passed to the language module can be accessed by the agent
by making retrieval requests to its declarative memory module.
The use of the (add-dm) command, in this context, allows
for situations in which multiple statement chunks must be
asserted to reﬂect the factual content of a message – unfortu-
nately, there is not always a one-to-one mapping between the
messages that represent a factoid and the statement chunks
that represent the semantic content of the factoid.
Aside from the message database, the current framework
incorporates a number of additional databases. One of these is
the connection database, which is used to deﬁne the structure
of the communication network that exists between agents.
This database contains records that specify the direct channels
of communication that exist between agents. The database is
queried by the messaging module to determine whether an
originating agent can post a message to a particular target
agent. Another database is the ‘triple database’. This is used
to store general information about the experimental simulation.
For example, the triple database can be used to store informa-
tion about the number of agents to create, the properties of
agents, the particular factoid set to use, the time allowed for
agents to complete the sensemaking task, and so on.
VI. LIMITATIONS
The approach described in Section V yields a system in
which multiple ACT-R agents, each associated with a distinct
cognitive model can engage in the sort of reasoning process
described in Section IV. Each agent can thus engage in
sensemaking in parallel with other agents. In contrast with the
situation in Section IV, there is no need to represent all of the
factoid-related information in an agent’s memory at the outset
of the simulation. Instead, agents can be provided with an
initial subset of factoids (by creating messages in the message
database), and then additional factoids can be made available
as the simulation progresses (either as a result of a centralized
information distribution mechanism, or, more interestingly, as
a result of agents posting messages to each other via their re-
spective messaging modules). As such, this system implements
the basic requirements of a system designed to support the
execution of cognitive social simulation experiments: each of
the agents engages in a sensemaking process and is also able
to communicate task-relevant information to other agents at
speciﬁc junctures in the problem-solving process. As it stands,
however, the current system possesses a number of limitations,
and these are the focus of future research and development
efforts. These limitations are described below.
A. Question/Answering Capabilities
At present, ACT-R agents can only communicate factual
information to each other; they cannot pose questions for
their peers to answer. In order to support question/answering
capabilities in the context of the current approach, agents
need to be able to 1) recognize the conditions under which a
question should be asked, 2) formulate the question in a way
that other agents can understand, 3) post the question to other
agents and 4) recognize what information is being sought in
a question posed by another agent. Of these, only points 1, 2
and 4 are signiﬁcant challenges – the posting of information to
other agents is already addressed by the solution presented in
Section V. The challenge related to recognizing the conditions
under which a question should be asked could perhaps be
addressed by the possibility of what are known as retrieval
failures in ACT-R. These are essentially situations in which
a request to the retrieval buffer fails to retrieve information
from declarative memory. A solution to the fourth challenge
could rest on the structure of the statement chunk used
for knowledge representation (see Section IV). In particular,
a question could be encoded as a specialized form of the
statement chunk in which the value slot is either empty
or absent. The values of the object and attribute slots
would then signal what information was being requested, and
this could be used by a recipient to implement a retrieval
request against their own declarative memory module.B. Communication Strategy
In addition to question/answering capabilities, agents will
need to make decisions about what to communicate, when to
communicate and who to communicate with. A number of
different strategies are possible here. For example, agents could
adopt a somewhat passive strategy and only communicate facts
when requested to do so, perhaps in response to a particular
question. Alternatively, they could adopt an active strategy in
which all information is readily communicated. Agents also
need to make decisions about who to communicate with. They
can thus adopt strategies that might be described as directed
or undirected in nature. Directed strategies, in this case, are
strategies where agents send messages to particular individuals
within their social network; undirected strategies, on the other
hand, are ones in which a message is broadcast to all connected
agents. A ﬁnal decision that agents need to make concerns
the nature of what should be communicated. Should agents,
for example, limit to their communication to information that
has been received from external sources (e.g., other agents),
or should they include information that has been inferred as a
result of their own sensemaking activity? A number of previous
studies using cognitive architectures (including ACT-R) have
begun to explore these issues in some detail [23][40], and a
closer examination of the solutions used in those particular
studies is likely to be helpful in the present context.
C. Cognitive Strategy
As discussed in Section IV, the particular strategy adopted
by agents to solve the ELICIT sensemaking task is unlikely
to be the same as that used as human subjects. In order to
better understand the effect of speciﬁc manipulations on the
performance of human subjects in the task it will thus be
necessary to pay closer attention to the kinds of strategies
adopted by human subjects. In all likelihood, this will require
studies involving the use of protocol analysis techniques [41].
D. Task Environment
Related to the previous point is the need to consider the role
that material elements of the task environment play in shaping
and inﬂuencing cognitive processes at both the individual and
collective levels. In cases where humans are tasked with the
ELICIT sensemaking problem, they typically resort to using
bio-external artefacts, such as pen and paper (see Section IV).
The external resources, in these cases, appear to be functioning
as a form of environmentally-extended working memory that
potentially enhances the cognitive capabilities of the human
subject [42]. Inasmuch as ACT-R attempts to duplicate the
cognitive constraints and limitations of the human brain, then
ACT-R sensemaking agents may need to rely on the same
sort of cognitive scaffolding as is seen in the case of their
environmentally-situated human counterparts. In particular, it
may be that a successful model of complex task performance in
naturalistic situations will need to avail itself of computational
analogues of the speciﬁc aspects of the physical problem-
solving environment that are exploited by human subjects. In
situations where human subjects are attempting to solve the
ELICIT sensemaking problem via computer interfaces, it may
thus be necessary to represent elements of the computer inter-
face within the ACT-R simulation. For example, in situations
where human subjects are able to view a list of messages
that have been posted by other agents, it may be necessary
to equip ACT-R agents with an ability to ‘see’ such messages
in order to replicate the kind of mnemonic support that is
provided by the real-world list. Recent versions of ACT-R
provide support for modeling agent-world interactions through
the use of what is called a ‘device’ object. The use of this
object to represent features of the task environment within
which agents are situated constitutes an important focus area
for future research efforts.
E. Task Features
In addition to these issues, it should be noted that all the
factoids in the ELICIT sensemaking task are assumed to be
true. This is clearly unlike the situation in real-world sense-
making contexts where agents have to deal with conﬂicting,
uncertain and dynamic information from a constantly evolving
situation. Therefore, in addition to the aforementioned issues,
future work will need to consider modiﬁcations to the ELICIT
sensemaking task in order to establish a closer alignment with
the kinds of situations faced by real-world sensemakers.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The aim of cognitive social simulation is to improve our
understanding of the complex inter-play between factors that
are spread across the psychological, social and technological
domains. This makes cognitive social simulation techniques
particularly appealing as a means to undertake experiments
into socially-distributed cognition. Cognitive social simulation
studies typically rely on the use of cognitive architectures;
however, to date, the most widely used cognitive architec-
ture – ACT-R – has seen only limited use in computational
studies exploring group-level cognitive dynamics. The current
paper reports on the results of an ongoing effort to develop
an experimental simulation capability that can be used to
undertake studies into socially-distributed cognition using the
ACT-R architecture. Using an existing experimental task as
a starting point, a cognitive model was developed to show
how sensemaking processes could be accommodated within
ACT-R. A cognitive social simulation capability was then
implemented in ACT-R by relying on the use of a combi-
nation of custom modules and memory-resident databases in
order to enable agents to exchange information during the
course of their sensemaking activities. This solution provides
the basic ingredients required to undertake cognitive social
simulation experiments into collective sensemaking; however,
further research needs to be undertaken in order to improve
the communicative capabilities of agents, as well as the task
environment in which they are situated (see Section VI). Our
future work in this area will aim to improve the sophistication
of the ACT-R cognitive model so that agents are able to
adopt a variety of communication strategies concerning what
information (i.e., factoids) to share and who to share the
information with. We will also seek to enable better forms of
agent-environment interaction by implementing a custom ACT-
R device object. These extensions will support cognitive social
simulations that aim to replicate and extend previous results
obtained with human subjects in the context of the ELICIT
sensemaking task [33].ACKNOWLEDGMENT
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